Third Circuit: Muslim Cop Not Allowed to Wear Religious Scarf on the Job

Holding:

In this employment discrimination case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that a Muslim officer working in the City of Philadelphia Police Department should not be allowed to wear her religious head scarf while on duty. The Third Circuit sustained appellee City’s argument that if not for the strict enforcement of the dress code as embodied in Directive 78, the essential values of impartiality, religious neutrality, uniformity, and the subordination of personal preference would be severely damaged to the detriment of the proper functioning of the police department. The Third Circuit agreed with the holding of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that Webb was able to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination. But the Third Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that the City would suffer an undue hardship if forced to permit Webb and other officers to wear religious clothing or ornamentation with their uniforms. On this basis, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Webb.

Detailed Summary:

In this employment discrimination case, the issue on appeal is whether a police officer’s request to wear religious garb with her uniform could be reasonably accommodated without imposing an undue burden upon the City of Philadelphia.

By way of background, Webb is a practicing Muslim, employed by the City of Philadelphia as a police officer since 1995. On February 11, 2003, Webb requested permission from her commanding officer to wear a headscarf while in uniform and on duty. The headscarf (a khimar or hijaab) is a traditional head covering worn by Muslim women.

Webb’s headscarf would cover neither her face nor her ears, but would cover her head and the back of her neck. Her request was denied in view of Philadelphia Police Department Directive 78, the authoritative memorandum which prescribes the approved Philadelphia police uniforms and equipment. Nothing in Directive 78 authorizes the wearing of religious symbols or garb as part of the uniform.

On February 28, 2003, Webb filed a complaint of religious discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. On August 12, 2003, while the matter was pending before the EEOC, Webb arrived at work wearing her headscarf. She refused to remove it when requested and was sent home for failing to comply with Directive 78.

On October 5, 2005, Webb brought suit against the City of Philadelphia, asserting three causes of action under Title VII—religious discrimination, retaliation/hostile work environment, and sex discrimination—and one cause of action under the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act (“RFPA:), 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2401. The district court found that Directive 78 and “(its) detailed standards with no accommodation for religious symbols and attire not only promote the need for uniformity, but also enhance cohesiveness, cooperation, and the esprit de corps of the police force.” Opinion, p. 5, citing Webb, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46872, at *11–12.

The district court held the City would suffer an undue hardship if forced to permit Webb and other officers to wear religious clothing or ornamentation with their uniforms. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims.

In this appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court’s holding that Webb was able to establish a prima case of religious discrimination.  It noted that Webb’s religious beliefs were sincere, her employer understood the conflict between her beliefs and her employment requirements, and she was disciplined for failing to comply with a conflicting official requirement.

Thus, the Third Circuit noted that burden shifted and the City should establish that to reasonably accommodate Webb (that is, allow her to wear a headscarf with her uniform) would constitute an undue hardship. The City offered no accommodation, contending any accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

The Third Circuit found that Webb did not refute Commissioner Sylvester Johnson’s argument that the police department’s religious neutrality (or the appearance of neutrality) as vital in both dealing with the public and working together cooperatively. The Third Circuit noted, and agreed with, the City’s contention that if not for the strict enforcement of the dress code as embodied in Directive 78, the essential values of impartiality, religious neutrality, uniformity, and the subordination of personal preference would be severely damaged to the detriment of the proper functioning of the police department.

Commissioner Johnson’s reasoning, the Third Circuit wrote, was supported by court precedents. Id., p. 13 citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1975) and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Third Circuit added that As a para-military entity, the Philadelphia Police Department requires “a disciplined rank and file for efficient conduct of its affairs.” Id., citing Kelley, 425 U.S. at 242.

The City’s reasoning for refusing to accord accommodation to Webb, according to the Third Circuit, sufficient to meet the more than de minimis cost of an undue burden. Id., citing World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 62,  84.

In sum, because the district court correctly concluded the City would suffer undue hardship under Title VII if required to grant Webb’s requested religious accommodation, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

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